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The theoretical implications of the effect of public-sector structure on 
public-sector performance have been explored in numerous studies since the 
appearance of the classic treatise on fiscal federalism by Oates  (1972). 
However,  the empirical relationship between structure and performance in the 
delivery of public services has received far less attention.  Renewed interest 
in the study of this relationship has been stirred by the Leviathan model of 
government behavior.  The Leviathan government seeks to exploit its monopoly 
powers by maximizing the size of its budget.  Brennan and Buchanan  (1980) 
argue that fragmentation of the public sector into independent decision-making 
units can serve to attenuate the monopoly power of government agents.  The 
line of argument follows the traditional industrial organization paradigm of 
structure,  conduct, and performance.  In the public-sector case, the argument 
runs from an increase in the number of independent public jurisdictions 
(suppliers),  to an increase in the degree of competition,  to a decrease in the 
relative size of the public sector  (the  particular performance measure 
utilized in the Leviathan context). 
The basis for the constraining effect of decentralization is founded upon 
the interjurisdictional competition for mobile resources,  both human and 
nonhuman, within a Tiebout setting.  The potential for migration across 
jurisdictions serves as a disciplining device within local public goods 
markets.  The actual effectiveness of decentralization as a mechanism for 
constraining relative public-sector size is,  of course, an empirical issue. 
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structure and performance provide little support for the Leviathan hypothesis. 
For example, Oates  (1985)  finds no significant relationship between increases 
in the total number of government units within a state and the share of state 
personal income that is spent on state and local services.  Nelson  (1987) 
offers several improvements and refinements on Oates' initial methodology, but 
the coefficient on what we consider to be his most preferred specification-- 
the general-purpose government variable in equation  (3)--has  a t-value of only 
0.91. 
It is not surprising that analyses such as Oates and Nelson,  which were 
based on state-level data, do not yield significant results.  If migration 
acts to discipline local governments,  as the theory suggests, then the cost 
for households to move between government jurisdictions must be relatively 
low. This can occur if households choose among jurisdictions within a local 
labor market, making it possible for them to change municipalities or school 
districts without necessarily changing jobs or leaving familiar surroundings. 
Indeed,  Oates  (1985, p. 750) argues that the discipline afforded by fiscal 
competition should increase as the geographical size of the unit of analysis 
decreases.  The standard metropolitan statistical area  (SMSA)  offers a 
convenient unit of analysis,  since it typically corresponds with a local labor 
market.  Eberts and Gronberg (1988),  following Nelson's  specification, 
estimate the relationship between local government share and number of 
jurisdictions at various levels of aggregation and find it to be negative and 
statistically significant at the county and SMSA levels but not at the state 
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statistically significant correlation between number of jurisdictions and 
local government expenditures per personal income. 
Although these results are consistent with the Leviathan model,  the basic 
specification  used throughout these empirical studies requires further 
refinement in order to distinguish between the Leviathan  hypothesis and 
competing ones.  Nelson  (1987)  suggests that his results,  which he interprets 
to be consistent with the Leviathan model of local government competition, 
could be compatible with other theories, such as the possibility that larger 
cities may provide a greater range of services due to economies of scale and 
indivisibilities of various services. 
In order to provide a more precise estimation of the Leviathan  hypothesis, 
we incorporate four modifications to the basic model used by Oates,  Nelson, 
and Zax.  First,  we offer more precise measures of government structure.  As 
noted by Fischel (1981), both the size distribution and the total number of 
local government units are important in assessing the competitiveness of local 
government structure.  We incorporate separate measures of fragmentation and 
concentration into the estimating model. 
Second,  we consider the possibility that different types of local 
governments (e.g.,  suburban, central-city,  county,  etc.) may respond 
differently to the disciplining effects of market structure within a 
metropolitan area.  Sjoquist  (1982)  finds that the total number of local 
municipalities  has a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
expenditures per capita of central cities.  Forbes and Zampelli  (1989)  find 
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has a positive and statistically significant effect on county government's 
share of personal income.  Zax (1989), on the other hand,  finds that when all 
governments within the county are aggregated to the county level, the number 
of jurisdictions within the county is negatively correlated with local 
government revenues per personal income.  Considering three types of  local 
governments:  municipalities  (other  than central cities),  central cities,  and 
all others  (typically  including counties, independent school districts,  and 
special districts),  may help to reconcile the contradictory results of Zax 
(1989)  and Forbes and Zampelli  (1989). 
Third, we explore more thoroughly the source of the negative correlation 
between the number of jurisdictions and local government size.  Without actual 
measures of local government services, it is difficult to determine whether 
the negative correlation between the number of jurisdictions and the size of 
the local government sector results from more efficient provision of the same 
services,  a reduction in services, or a redistribution of service 
responsibilities among the various local government units.  We attempt to 
control for these possibilities in two ways.  First,  we account for the 
correlation among the three types of jurisdictions by estimating the behavior 
of each within a system of equations using Zellner's seemingly unrelated 
estimation technique.  Second,  in order to determine whether the differences 
in the aggregate size of the local jurisdictions are due to differences in the 
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government structure on various functional expenditure categories is estimated 
separately. 
Fourth,  we explicitly enter household mobility measures into the analysis. 
Although household mobility is considered the disciplining device for local 
government performance,  no one has explicitly entered mobility measures into 
their analysis.  Zax purports to account for mobility, but includes only 
indirect measures of mobility such as percentage of population in the county 
in 1975.  We use gross migration flows within and between the suburbs and 
central cities within each SMSA,  which we view as a more direct measure of 
household mobility. 
For our sample of 227 SMSAs,  solid statistical support for the 
fragmentation/decentralization  hypothesis is found for both suburbs and 
central cities.  An increase in the number of competing general-purpose 
suburban government units in an SMSA is associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in the relative income share of local public 
expenditures.  An increase in the concentration index for the suburban local 
public sector is found to be positively related to the relative public share 
measure.  Furthermore, the behavioral response to market structure varies 
significantly between suburbs and central cities.  Finally,  increased mobility 
serves to reduce the size of the local public sector.  These findings 
establish an empirical connection between the structure of the local public 
service market and its performance. 
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In order to estimate the structure-performance relationship in local 
public service markets,  we must make several decisions regarding definitions. 
First,  we must choose a unit of observation for the public market.  Within a 
Tiebout framework, competition among jurisdictional suppliers of local public 
goods is fostered by the mobility of consumer-voters.  Close competitors are 
defined in spatial terms.  For this study we choose the SMSA as the relevant 
spatial market within which alternative municipal suppliers compete.  This 
choice is motivated largely from a belief that the increased dispersion of 
employment opportunities  within SMSAs has increased the viability of non-Urban 
Area SMSA sites.  This obviates Fischel's (1981)  objection to the use of an 
SMSA market definition rather than an Urban Area definition. 
Second,  we must choose a measure of local government performance. Oates 
(1985)  suggests that the relative size of the public sector,  as measured by 
the ratio of expenditures  (or  revenues) to personal income,  might serve as a 
useful performance indicator.  The Leviathan view of government,  exemplified 
by Brennan and Buchanan (1980),  suggests that monopolistic public suppliers 
appropriate an inefficiently large share of resources for public-sector  use. 
Therefore,  structural changes that result in decreases in the relative size of 
the public sector can be interpreted as enhancing or improving efficiency 
within this framework.  Following Oates,  we use as our performance measure the 
ratio of general expenditures to personal income for the three classes of 
local governments within an SMSA.  General expenditures include six budget 
categories:  schools,  fire,  police, welfare, sanitation, and parks.  In order 
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categories, we also run separate regressions for each category.  The variation 
in the income share of municipal expenditures for the 25 largest SMSAs for the 
1976-1977  fiscal year is shown in table 1. 
Third,  we measure the structure of the market for municipally-provided 
services in two dimensions:  fragmentation and concentration.  We define 
fragmentation  as the number of government units within an SMSA per capita.  We 
include two measures of fragmentation:  one for municipalities  (both 
suburbs and central cities) and one for other jurisdictions  (independent 
school districts, counties, and special districts).  The considerable 
variation in the degree of fragmentation across the 25 largest SMSAs is 
illustrated in table 1. 
Fischel  (1981)  argues that the number of cities alone may not accurately 
represent the degree of competition in the public goods market.  Borrowing 
from the industrial organization literature,  Fischel promotes the use of a 
four-firm  (city)  concentration index to capture the relative competitiveness 
of suburban local government structure.  Fischel constructs such an index for 
the 25 largest urban areas in 1970 based upon concentration  with respect to 
land area.  This corresponds to what Zax  (1989)  refers to as centralism: the 
share of the top tier of government. 
For our analysis we constructed a four-city concentration index for 227 
SMSAs in 1977 based upon concentration with respect to population.2  More 
precisely, the concentration index is calculated as the ratio of the 
population of the four most populated suburban municipalities to the total 
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population).  The switch to a population-based concentration measure seems 
most appropriate when addressing the impact of structure on the delivery of 
local public services.  The combined impact of a) using the SMSA rather than 
the urbanized area as the unit of observation,  b)  updating the sample to 1976, 
and c) basing the concentration measure on population instead of land area can 
be seen in table 2. 
In addition to measuring the competitive structure within the suburban 
submarket, we also wish to measure the relative monopoly power of the central 
city vis-a-vis the suburban sector.  Proceeding in a similar fashion, we 
measure the central-city concentration index as the fraction of total SMSA 
population residing in the central city.  Concentration values for central 
cities of the 25 largest SMSAs are displayed in table 1. 
According to the Leviathan hypothesis,  increased fragmentation should 
result in decreases in the relative size of both the central city and the 
suburban public sectors.  Increases in the four-suburb concentration ratio, 
indicating a less competitively structured suburban sector,  are expected to be 
positively related to the income share of the suburban municipal sector. 
Similarly, an increase in the central city's share of SMSA population is 
expected to increase the size of the central city's  government sector.  The 
expected effects across submarkets of the concentration measures are not 
obvious,  particularly for the "other" government category. 
Finally,  since competition is assumed to be achieved through household 
mobility, explicit measures of mobility should be included in the estimation. 
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migration flows between 1975 and 1980.  Two measures are included: 
1)  migration from central cities to the remainder of the SMSA and migration 
among suburbs,  and 2)  migration from the remainder of the SMSA to the central 
city.4  The two gross migration flow measures are expressed as percentages of 
the SMSA population.  Including these two measures separately allows us to 
estimate the relative disciplining effects of population inflows and outflows 
on local government performance.  In addition,  net migration flows are 
included to measure the overall effect of population increases or declines on 
local governments. 
It is not clear a priori whether inflows or outflows of households would 
have a  more significant effect on government performance.  Local governments 
experiencing large outflows of households may have an incentive to cut costs 
and consequently provide services more efficiently, thus claiming a smaller 
portion of personal income.  On the other hand, local governments experiencing 
a large inflow of households may be attractive because of their more efficient 
provision of local government services.  It is difficult to make a precise 
interpretation of these results since we only consider cross-sectional 
analysis and we do not have measures of the quantity and quality of local 
public services. 
Migration results can also be interpreted in terms of the marginal cost of 
providing services to inmigrants and outmigrants,  as described by Buchanan and 
Goetz (1972),  and Pauly  (1970).  If the marginal cost of providing services to 
inmigrants is less relative to the personal income they bring to the 
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opposite would,  of course,  hold for a positive correlation between inmigration 
and size.  This interpretation depends on the services demanded by the 
inmigrants and the outmigrants relative to those households already in the 
community. 
111,  Empirical Analysis 
Our data set consists of observations on local public-sector 
characteristics of 227 SMSAs for fiscal year 1977.  Our empirical model 
consists of three equations corresponding to aggregate measures of the three 
SMSA submarkets described earlier.  The dependent variable is the ratio of 
local government expenditures to personal income for the various groups of 
governments within an SMSA.  For suburbs,  we totalled municipal expenditures 
for all suburbs within an SMSA and divided that number by total personal 
income of the suburbs.  For central cities,  we simply divided a central city's 
expenditures by its personal income.  For other governments,  we divided 
expenditures of all other local governments by total personal income for the 
SMSA.  We used total SMSA personal income for this group of governments 
because in many cases they overlap suburbs and municipalities. 
The key explanatory variables are the measures of local government 
fragmentation and concentration,  and household mobility.  The anticipated 
effects of these variables have already been discussed. 
The other explanatory variables include state mandates, per capita 
personal income, intergovernmental grants as a percentage of total revenues, 
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minimum constraints on certain local government activities.  The presence of 
such strictures would, therefore,  be positively associated with the relative 
size of the local public sector.  The relationship between per capita income 
and relative public sector size has been subjected to considerable empirical 
scrutiny.  Investigation of Wagner's Law of a positive correlation between 
increases in income and increases in government's relative claims upon the 
income has sparked much research and kindled considerable controversy. 
Contrary to the national focus of most studies, our results provide some 
evidence of the workings of Wagner's Law at the local level.  The means and 
standard deviations of the variables are shown in table 3. 
Asare~ate  Estimates 
The suburban,  central-city,  and other government equations are estimated 
using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression technique.  The estimates are 
shown in table 4.  The results provide strong support for the fragmentation/ 
competition  hypothesis.  As expected,  the number of municipalities per capita 
has a  negative and statistically significant effect on all three types of 
local governments.  Interestingly,  there is no statistically significant 
difference in the magnitude of these coefficients among the three equations. 
The number of nonmunicipal governments per capita has a negative effect on the 
size of suburbs and central cities, but neither coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
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governments.  The number of nonmunicipal governments per capita positively 
affects the size of "other" governments and is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level.  Interpretation  of the positive effect of this 
fragmentation  variable on the "other" government expenditures is somewhat 
difficult since this category contains several different types of governments. 
However,  the results are consistent with Nelson  (1987)  and Forbes and Zampelli 
(1989).  The former finds that a proliferation of special districts,  which 
usually provide specialized services to the SMSA, increases the size of the 
local government sector.  The latter find that an increase in the number of 
counties in the SMSA is also associated with an increase in the ratio of 
county expenditures to personal income. 
The concentration hypothesis is also supported by our results, but only 
for suburbs.  Estimates show that a higher concentration of population within 
the four most populated suburbs increases the size of suburban governments, 
which is consistent with the notion of monopoly power and corroborates the 
centralism findings of Zax  (1989).  The concentration of suburbs does not have 
a statistically significant effect on either central cities or other local 
governments. 
Moreover, the results for central-city concentration run counter to the 
concentration argument.  Estimates indicate that as the central city becomes 
more dominant in the SMSA (i.e.,  its share of SMSA population increases),  the 
size of central-city government decreases.  The negative relationship between 
central-city concentration and central-city size is difficult to understand. 
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expenditure categories in the next section. 
Estimates of the two gross migration variables suggest that household 
mobility plays an important role in disciplining local governments. 
Furthermore,  the constraining effect comes primarily from households moving 
into a particular government jurisdiction rather than from households leaving 
a jurisdiction.  Gross migration from central cities to suburbs has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on the size of suburban governments. 
However,  the loss of households from central cities does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the size of central-city governments, 
although the coefficient is negative. 
The size*of  central-city governments is affected similarly by 
inmigration.  Gross migration from suburbs to central cities has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on the size of central-city governments. 
The effect of outmigration is also negative but is not statistically 
significant at any respectable confidence level. 
Opposite results are found for county governments.  Both gross inmigration 
and gross outmigration increase the size of the "other" category of 
governments. It is not obvious why county governments,  school districts,  and 
special districts should increase their size as mobility increases.  In the 
case of counties and special districts,  households are simply moving within 
their jurisdictions.  In the case of schools, they should have an incentive 
structure similar to municipalities.  One possible explanation is that 
mobility within the SMSA imposes some cost on local governments.  However,  the 
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well as central-city and suburban governments.  As mentioned earlier, a clear 
interpretation of this effect is difficult without measures of the quantity 
and quality of local public services, which are unavailable. 
The signs of the coefficients of the other variables,  which were included 
to control for various demographic characteristics and financial incentives, 
are consistent with our expectations.  The size of local governments increases 
with an increase in intergovernmental revenue,  with more state-imposed 
mandates for providing various local government services, and with larger 
populations. The size of local governments,  on the other hand, decreases with 
higher per capita income.  These results are consistent with results found by 
Ram  (1987)  for a cross-section analysis of 115 countries.  Zax  (1989)  also 
finds a negative relationship between revenues per income and income per 
capita. 
Individual Functional Cateaorv Estimates 
The various structure and mobility variables are not expected to 
influence all functions of local governments in the same direction or with the 
same level of statistical significance.  Moreover, variation in the scope of 
the services offered by local governments could account for the correlation 
between local government size and structure and household mobility.  As a 
first attempt to control for this variation,  we estimated expenditures per 
personal income for six budget categories for suburbs and central cities.  OLS 
was used to estimate equations for categories that were supplied by aggregate 
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provision by central cities of fire protection, the provision of police 
protection by suburbs and central cities, and the provision of parks by 
central cities.  The remaining categories were not supplied by suburbs and 
central cities in some SMSAs.  Because of the censored nature of these data, 
the Tobit estimation technique was used.  The results for selected variables 
are shown in table 5. 
The results are consistent with the findings in the previous section. The 
number of municipal  jurisdictions per capita has a negative effect on 
expenditures per personal income for all categories.  All but four 
coefficients, primarily for central cities,  are statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level.  The effect of the number of other jurisdictions per 
capita is also negative,  but only a third of the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
The central-city concentration measure has the most widespread effect on 
the suburban expenditure categories,  while the four-suburb concentration ratio 
primarily affects suburban police and fire expenditures. 
The apparent anomaly concerning the relationship between central-city 
concentration and local government size that surfaced for the aggregate 
estimates seems to disappear for the individual expenditure estimates. 
Somewhat surprisingly,  the negative correlations between central-city 
concentration and central-city expenditures are not statistically significant 
at any respectable confidence level.  However,  for the categories of 
sanitation and parks,  an increase in central-city concentration increases 
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cities is offset by a decrease in suburban expenditures on sanitation and 
parks expenditure, providing further evidence of a tradeoff between suburban 
and central-city expenditures. 
The diminutive effect of mobility on the size of local government is felt 
primarily in school,  welfare,  fire,  and police expenditures.  According to the 
estimates,  mobility increases the income share of expenditures for parks and 
sanitation.  This general pattern of results holds for both suburban and 
central-city governments. 
Examining the effect of household mobility on individual budget categories 
offers some insight into the relative effects of various types of households 
on the net fiscal surplus of local governments.  The relative contribution of 
various household groups will depend upon their preferences of local services 
and their income level.  For example, according to the estimates,  central-city 
households moving to the suburbs cause suburban police expenditures to rise 
more than suburban personal income.  On the other hand,  these same 
central-city  migrants reduce welfare expenditures of suburban municipalities 
relative to their contribution  to personal income.  One could also interpret 
these results as saying that central-city residents prefer to locate in 
municipalities with a high level of police protection and a minimal welfare 
program. 
When central-city  residents leave central cities for the suburbs, they 
impose a marginal cost on the remaining residents in terms of higher 
expenditures relative to personal income on all categories but schools and 
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reduce the expenditures relative to personal income on all central-city 
expenditures while imposing very little cost on the suburban residents they 
left behind. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The decentralized U.S. government structure has been both praised for 
promoting efficiency and blamed for stimulating excessive local government 
spending.  This paper examines the relationship between the number of local 
governments within local labor markets and their expenditures.  Particular 
attention is given to four aspects of the structure/performance relationship. 
First, local government structure is captured by two measures:  fragmentation 
and concentration.  Second,  since different types of local governments may 
respond differently to the disciplining effects of local government structure, 
the analysis looks at suburbs,  central cities,  and all other local governments 
separately.  Third,  six individual expenditure categories are analyzed 
separately in order to examine the effects of government structure on 
individual government functions.  Fourth,  household migration is included in 
the analysis to take into account its disciplining effect on local 
governments. 
For a sample of 227 U.S. metropolitan areas,  solid empirical support for 
the fragmentation/decentralization  hypothesis is found for both suburbs and 
central cities.  An increase in the number of competing suburban government 
units in an SMSA is associated with a decrease in the relative income share of 
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suburban local public sector is found to be positively related to the relative 
public share measure.  The behavioral response to market structure varies 
among suburbs and central cities,  and across the various local government 
functions.  Finally,  increased mobility serves to reduce the size of the local 
government. 
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1.  The number of single-purpose governments is the sum of the number of 
townships,  school districts,  and special districts, except in Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey,  and the New England states,  where townships are not included.  The 
reason for these exceptions is that the functional responsibilities closely 
resemble municipalities in these states. 
2.  A few SMSAs were not included in the sample due to a variety of problems, 
including differences in definitions of government units and missing 
observations. 
3.  Local government expenditures  (or  revenue) have also been suggested as a 
basis for the concentration ratios.  However, we feel that population is more 
in keeping with the Tiebout mechanism since it is the potential to migrate 
that is conjectured to discipline local governments. 
4.  Migration data were obtained from Bureau of the Census, Geographical 
Mobility for Metropolitan Areas,  November 1984,  tables 2 and 8. 
5.  The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental  Relations surveyed local 
governments about 77 functional subcomponents in five broad areas: state 
personnel other than police,  fire, and education  (15  components);  public 
safety  (31);  environmental protection  (8);  social services and miscellaneous 
(10);  and education  (13). 
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(1)  (2  (3  (4) 
Cities  Expenditures 


























Note:  Column 1 is the number or municipalities per 1,000  SMSA population; 
column 2 is the four-suburban concentration ratio;  column 3 is the central 
cities to total SMSA population ratio;  column 4  is average suburban 
expenditures  (on  the six categories) per $1,000  personal income. 
Source:  Government finance and structure variables are created from U.S. 
Bureau of the Census,  Governments Division,  Census of Governments,  1977. 
Personal income and population data for each municipality and SMSA are 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,  1977. 
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Best available copyTable 2:  Suburban Concentration Ratios:  A Comparison with Fischel's 
Estimates 
Fischel Measure:  Eberts/Gronberg 























Buff  a10 
Denver 
San Jose 
Source:  Fischel  (1981)  and author's calculations of data from Census of 
Governments. 
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Best available copyTable 3:  Sample Statistics of Government Structure and Performance Variables 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation 
Municipal jurisdictions  .061  .045 
per 1,000  people 
Special districts per 
1,000  people 
Four-suburb concentration 
ratio  (percentage) 
Central city concentration 
ratio  (percentage) 
Gross migration  (percentage  of 
SMSA population) 
a)  central city to remainder 
b)  remainder to central city 
Net migration  (percentage  of 
SMSA population) 
Per capita personal income, $1,000~ 
a)  municipalities  6913.7  1152.7 
b)  central cities  6781.9  961.40 
c)  other  6718.7  950.06 
Intergovernmental revenue as 
share of total revenue 
a)  municipalities  1.06  1.48 
b)  central cities  1.02  .83 
c)  other  1.50  .91 
Population,  100,000s 
a)  municipalities 
b)  central cities 
c)  other 
State mandates  38.93  11.47 
Expenditures per $1,000  income 
a)  municipalities  1.60  1.54 
b)  central cities  3.19  2.89 
C)  other  5.61  1.87 
Source:  See text and table 1. 
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Best available copyTable 4:  Concentration and Competitive Effects on Public Sector Size, 
all SMSAs,  1976-77 
Coefficients 
Ex~lanatorv  Variables  Suburbs  Central Cities  Other 
Municipal jurisdictions 
per 1,000  people 
Special districts per 
1,000  people 
Four-suburb concentration  .016  .0015  .0048 
ratio  (2.93)  (.I51  (  81) 
Central city concentration  - .027  - .018  .001 
ratio  (-5.55)  (-2.02)  (.I91 
Gross migration from central 
city to remainder of SMSA 
(percentage  of SMSA pop) 
Gross migration from 
remainder to central city 
(percentage  of SMSA pop) 
Net migration  (percentage  of 
SMSA pop) 
Per capita personal income, 
$1,000~ 
Intergovernmental revenue as 
share of total revenue 
Population,  100,000s 
State mandates 
Constant 
R-  square 
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Best available copyNote:  Equations estimated simultaneously using Zellnerts  seemingly unrelated 
regression technique.  Asymptotic T-ratios in parentheses.  Number of 
observations equals 227.  The dependent variable included expenditures for the 
following functions:  schools,  welfare,  fire, police,  sanitation,  and parks. 
Source:  Municipal finances were obtained from Census of Governments,  1977. 
Personal income and population came from Bureau of Economic Analysis.  State 
mandates are from Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
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Best available copyTable 5:  Concentration and Fragmentation Effects on  Public Sector Size,  all 
SMSAs,  selected categories,  1976-77 
Variables  Suburbs 
Independent/Dependent  Schools  Welfare  Fire  Police  Sanit  Parks 
Municipal jurisdictions  -8.59  -3.82  -7.00  -1.15  -4.28  -6.23 
per 1,000  people  (-2.29)  (-1.70) (-3.52)  (-3.93) (-2.17) (-3.15) 
Special districts  - .21  -.57  -1.36  -  .08  - .26  -  .14 
per 1,000  people  (-.30)  (-.70)  (-2.33)  (-.96)  (-.44)  (-.24) 
Four-suburb concen-  .003  .003  .014  .002  .001  .008 
tration ratio  (.41)  (.65) (2.88)  (2.81)  (.17)  (1.81) 
Central City concen-  - .023  -.024  -.  227  - .001  - .007  -.014 
tration ratio  (-4.14)  (-5.289 (-5.63)  (-2.39) (-1.85) (-3.52) 
Gross migration:  -  .85  - .007  - .001  .001  .003  .005 
CC to suburb  (-3.52)  (-3.71)  (-.78)  (2.87)  (1.81)  (3.08) 
Gross migration:  -1.67  - .030  - .I15  - .002  .009  .007 
suburb to CC  (-1.09)  (-2.47)  -1)  (-1.13)  (.84)  (.72) 
Central Cities 
Municipal jurisdictions  -9.67  2.18  - .98  -2.33  -2.51  - .I55 
per 1,000  people  (-2.67)  (-95)  (-2.88)  (-5.53) (-1.33)  (-  .42) 
Other jurisdictions  -1.11  -1.80  - .I16  - .073  - .906  - -308 
per 1,000  people  (-1.81)  (-1.87) (-1.10)  (-.56)  (-1.55) (-2.68) 
Four  -  suburb concen-  - .007  .013  -.0001  -.330  -.0012  -.0005 
tration ratio  (-1.10)  (2.32)  -15  (-3.41)  .  (-.28)  (-.60) 
Central City concen-  - .006  - .007  - .001  - .I21  .007  .001 
tration ratio  (-1.13)  (-1.42) (-1.55)  (-1.41)  (2.59)  (3.65) 
Gross migration:  - .62  - .003  .001  .002  .004  .001 
CC to suburb  (-2.63)  (-1.28)  (2.80)  (4.86)  (2.59)  (3.65) 
Gross migration:  -3.40  - .026  - .006  - .006  .003  - .0004 
suburb to CC  (-2.03)  (-1.79) (-3.13)  (-2.62)  (.28)  (-.20) 
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Best available copyNote:  Equations are estimated using Tobit technique except for those 
functions that are supplied by all governments, in which case OLS is used. 
These functions include central city fire,  suburban and central police,  and 
central city parks.  The regression equations included the same set of 
explanatory variables as used in table 4,  but are not shown to save space. 
Asymptotic T-ratios for Tobit and T-ratios for OLS are in parentheses. 
Source:  See table 4. 
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